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Resource Use Decisions: A Framework for Studying
Religion and Sustainable Environments

Mark Larrimore

Analyses of everyday religion and sustainable
environments in the Himalaya are not helped
much by the blunt instruments of ‘world
religions’ approaches to religion and ecology.
This article suggests that a better grounded
understanding, especially helpful for policy
makers integrating case studies from widely
varying regions, might be gained by bypassing
debates about the nature of ‘religion’ entirely.
Inspired by discussions in the Everyday Religion
and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya
(ERSEH) project, this article proposes a
research framework with the deliberately
mundane name resource use decisions.
Attending to the reasons given, in various
settings and to various stakeholders, for
decisions regarding the cultivation and use of
resources will take us beyond unreflectively
secular understandings of these terms, as
well as beyond reified understandings of

‘other-worldly’ religion which exist more in the
texts of scholars than in the everyday worlds
where religion lives. Consonant with the recent
turn to ‘lived religion,’ resource use decisions
draws attention to the religious creativity of
agents at every level, lay, specialist and even
other-than-human, and to the categories
they employ in navigating and sustaining
religious worlds. This approach better suits the
ecologically, culturally and politically varied and
changing Himalayan region, but also suggests
ways in which Himalayan studies can contribute
to broader reflection on the nature of religious
practices and traditions in a pluralizing,
globalizing and environmentally changing
world.
Keywords: religion, environment, lived religion, resources,
Himalaya.
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Most disturbing was the apparent deflection
of my questions about religion with responses
that concerned the welfare and integrity of the
community. (Ramble 2008: 13)
Introduction
The image of the Himalaya as all soaring peaks, with scant
attention to what happens in the valleys and hillsides between and below, is not unlike a common way of thinking
about world religions. Indeed, the two caricatures unite
in the cliché of the holy man perched on a mountaintop
dispensing wisdom to questioners who have left the flat
world but are doomed to return to it. The truths of religion, pellucid in the pure air of sacred climes, are obscured
in the valleys below—which is what drove the sage to the
peaks in the first place. More grounded studies of Himalayan experience, struggling against such understandings,
have long called for “retheorizing religion” for this region
(Grieve 2006).
The case studies included in this special section of
HIMALAYA offer a kindred challenge to dominant
conceptions of religion. In the broader set of conversations
bridging academic, policy, and activist communities
and concerns from which they emerged, Everyday
Religion and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya,
the focus on ‘everyday religion’ proved liberating. The
modifier ‘everyday’ overcame misgivings many had
about approaching ‘religion’ as an object of research and
reflection. Questions about what could count as ‘religion’
and how to engage with it, carefully avoided at the level
of theory, proved accessible and fruitful when linked to
questions of practice and everyday life, leading finally
to supple analyses of the interpenetration of values and
practices theoretical views of religion render opaque if not
unintelligible.
The current essay articulates a way of approaching religion and ecology questions inspired by these discussions.
Neither embracing nor ignoring the problematic category
of religion, it instead works (a little polemically) with the
prosaic-seeming categories ‘resource,’ ‘use’ and ‘decision.’
It seeks to surface patterns of practice invisible to naively
religious and secular accounts of environmental issues
alike. After laying out the model, I relate it to the turn to
‘lived religion’ in the contemporary academic study of
religion, making explicit ways it might help us get beyond
the distortions generated by modern western categories
of religion in general, and ‘world religions’ in particular.
Familiarity with these debates isn’t necessary for use of
this model, and some of the insights it offers will be old
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hat to professional Himalayanists. The affinities are worth
spelling out, however. These case studies can not only be
brought into conversation by the model, but might also
help broader discussions of ‘religion and the environment,’
‘religion and ecology’ and ‘religion and nature’ outflank assumptions rooted in dominant views of ‘religion,’ arguably
“the most ideological of western creations” (Dubuisson
2003: 147).
Resource Use Decisions
Participants in Everyday Religion and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya (ERSEH) initially shied away from
discussion of religion because most theories of religion,
academic and popular, start with the affirmation or rejection of a supernatural, transcendent or cosmic context
for human existence. The resource use decisions model
(hereafter RUD) starts closer to the ground, calculatedly
appearing banal: the everyday lives of ordinary people. Its
starting assumption is that human projects of every kind
require resources. Whatever may be claimed for other powers and entities, human beings cannot make something out
of nothing. Resources are generally limited, often shared
and usually require care. Decisions have to be made about
their cultivation, employment and distribution within (and
beyond) human communities. “Religion-like” practices
(Taves 2012), however conceived by those who engage in
and support them, are braided with other practices, sharing resources like time and space, labor and wealth.1
At its most basic, a resource is a thing you can do other
things with. Not much can be done without resources, including the religion-like. But it isn’t just that religion uses
secular resources. Human projects of all kinds use religious
resources. Waters, including variously pure or purified waters, are resources. So are the energies of mountains, the
goodwill of ghosts and gods, the powers of special objects
and of those specialists born with or trained in particular
abilities. Ecology frameworks can facilitate the modeling
of connections between components of local systems and
can help clarify what is known and not known. A broad
understanding of resources makes clear the extent to
which resource uses are mutual and relational. The idea of
resources stockpiled independently of projects, and indeed
constituted as resources by this stockpiling (what Heidegger 1982: 17 called “standing reserve”) obscures these
synergies and dependencies and the broader communities
of human and other-than-human persons (Harvey 2005)
cultivating them.
Use refers to the engagement of resources in human
practices and projects. This is again a deliberately broad

definition. It is designed to draw attention to the variety
of ends of human activity, a variety far exceeding the
emaciated ideal of the utility-maximizing homo economicus
(Foley 2006). People don’t just act in less than economically
‘rational’ ways in using the resources at their disposal; significant parts of culture involve sacrifice and squander of
surplus. (Georges Bataille [1992] suggests this is the heart
of religion.) Employed unreflectively, the term ‘use’ could
be a limiting term, privileging consumption over creation,
cultivation and relationship, but it has the advantage of
reminding us that resources can get used up, that human
activities—including ‘religious’ ones—cost something. In
practice the distinction between resources and uses is
not easy to draw. One of the main uses is the production
or reproduction of resources, and one main category of
resources is human time, effort and skill in use. In tandem
with thinking of resources in broad, mutual and relational
ways which include the ‘religious,’ it may be best to think
of resource uses in terms of relationships of care and reciprocity across human and other-than-human populations.
Decisions, finally, draws attention to the determinations
people make—individually and as members of collectivities—about resource use in ever changing social, economic and cultural landscapes. The need for decision is not
restricted to times of change, although these are the times
when decisions are most self-conscious. Our attention
should be directed not only to what is decided but to how
decisions are come to, as people seek advice and precedents; cite, balance or contest authorities; seek validation
from various sources; and give reasons of various kinds to
various stakeholders (Schielke and Debevek 2012: 2). Resource uses affect others, so decisions about resource uses
will inevitably be made in the context of relationships—not
all of them, of course, harmonious. These relationships
should not be understood as restricted only to living human beings. Relationships with spirits and forests can be
just as messy as interpersonal human relationships and are
in many ways entwined with them (Orsi 2005; Jain 2011).
The language of decision, too, must be handled with some
care. Often what strikes observers as a decision is not experienced as such by those making it. There are many situations in which initiative is disowned or at least disavowed.
Decisions taken by past generations congeal as custom and
tradition, which may seem to have an almost superhuman authority (Bourdieu 1992); societies seem capable of
“provisionally forgetting” their role in some of their own
decisions (Ramble 2008: 356). Human beings also aren’t the
only deciders, as dreams and rituals of divination and augury make clear. Many people are excluded from decisions.

And yet resources are allocated or reallocated for old and
new uses, and these changed or unchanged circumstances
sometimes need to be explained to the people affected—
even if it is to assert why they cannot be questioned. And
of course decisions can be contested, too. Observing when
and how habitual decision-making practices are upset and
recalibrated can reveal how structures of authority such as
expertise are recognized, challenged and reconfigured.
The RUD model is not exhaustive but it offers a promising
template for facilitating the analysis and integration of
case studies in policy contexts. The categories of resource,
use, and decision are intended to focus attention on elements of social, ecological and symbolic systems overshadowed by bulky definitions of sacred or secular. They
show that elements too often quarantined as ‘religious’ are
engaged and active throughout these practices. Distinctions made on the ground complicate the categories commonly employed in policy discussions, showing these to be
incomplete, distortive of indigenous understandings and
experiences of relation and agency. By holding theories of
religion at bay as it assembles fuller and more site-specific
repertoires of resources, uses and decisions, the model
has the potential to free policy analysis from invidious
religious, as well as secular, assumptions.
Lived Religion Approaches
While inspired by the discussions around Everyday Religion and Sustainable Environments in the Himalaya, the
RUD framework has affinities with the recent turn among
religious studies scholars in the United States to what
is known as ‘lived religion.’2 This concept is a relatively
recent arrival on the academic scene, without an orthodoxy or even a dedicated journal. In part this is because
it comes at the confluence of several academic disciplines. One could say that focus on ‘lived religion’ arose
in tandem with the turn to the social in history, the turn
to the cultural in sociology, and every discipline’s turn to
the ethnographic. It has been shaped by the discoveries
and re-descriptions of women’s history and ‘history from
below,’ leavened by questions about the nature and future
of religion in modern and putatively secularizing western
societies, and is in turn reshaping the field of religious
studies (see Orsi 2012b; Roberts 2013; Lewis 2015).
The term ‘lived religion’ suggests differences between
religion as preached and as practiced.3 It also emphasizes
that, contrary to the grim or gleeful predictions of a century’s worth of secularization theorists, reports of religion’s
demise have been greatly exaggerated. It’s alive!—but it
lives in ways we are only belatedly coming to understand.
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Indeed, the lived religion approach finds signs of vitality in
the very practices and traditions which advocates as well
as critics of ‘religion’ have tended to read as signs of decay.
Let me focus on three important commitments of this approach: the interdependence of everyday and elite people
and practices, the prominence of this-worldly concerns,
and the syncretic bricolage of traditions.
First, the lived religion approach foregrounds the everyday
lives of ordinary (lay) people, but is not interested exclusively in them. Unlike many studies devoted to ‘popular’ or
‘everyday’ religion, it does not imagine these to be effectively independent of the ‘bigger’ traditions studied by
scholars of texts and institutions. Everyday practices are
informed by and articulated in tension with larger institutions, discourses and power structures. The process is not
necessarily adversarial. Distinctions like those between
official and everyday religion are not so much false as locally constructed and contested. Where western-modeled
theological or cosmic histories tell of religious traditions
and institutions created from outside the human world,
and certainly from outside the world of everyday life,
lived religion insists on human participation: “there is ...
no religion that people have not taken up in their hands”
(Orsi 2003: 172). Theories positing a fundamental conflict
between sacred and profane (Durkheim 1995; Eliade 1987)
are abstractions of the scholar’s study. The lived religion
orientation finds instead that “hybridity, pastiche and
‘making do’ are the constitutive aspects of religion”—even
in the lives of elites and specialists—and as such are “appropriate places to begin discussions of ethics and norms
(Bender 2012: 274).
Second, the student of lived religion is not surprised when
people engage in religion-like practices for ‘this-worldly’
benefit. The study of lived religion takes for granted that
religious practices emerge and are maintained or modified
because they answer needs—including worldly human
ones. (I use terms like ‘worldly,’ ‘this-worldly’ and ‘mundane’ polemically.) Attentive as much to the daily work of
maintaining life and relationships as to the ways religious
practices are modified in response to changing circumstances, it doesn’t wonder at the this-worldly aims of religious practices seeking fertility, long life and even success
in business and education, rather insisting that we learn to
see how these might be religion-like concerns too.
Third, the study of lived religion sees bricolage as normal
and healthy.4 The mixing and mingling of resources, uses
and decisions from many sources is not condemned as
fundamentally irreverent but accepted as part of practices
of creative problem-solving. Bricolage should be distin-
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guished from the “lazy sobriquet of syncretism” (Ramble
2008: 215), a term implying a wide-ranging and unmotivated mashing and mangling of traditions. Bricoleurs navigate
within and across traditions; they don’t seek to unify let
alone homogenize them. Their concern is not systematic
(they generally have neither the need nor the power to
construct ‘a religion’); their practice in its way depends
on a loose plurality of resources. The game-changer might
be the move from assuming that syncretism is the deviant exception, in need of explanation and mitigation, to
seeing works of what’s been called “anti-syncretism”—
setting-apart, purification, systematization—as the ones
requiring explanation (Shaw and Stewart 1994). This
change of stance will not just open non-pathologizing
perspectives on the messy virtuosity of practice; it generates non-pathologizing perspectives on purity concerns,
too. From a lived religion perspective we could see the
setting apart of elite practices and institutions as a form of
resource cultivation.
One could summarize the upshot of the lived religion
orientation as seeing all people as engaged in making and
remaking worlds (Orsi 2003, 2005). The worlds of religious
people are not necessarily built in compensation, correction or refutation of the unsatisfactory world of everyday life. It is better not to assume that everyday life and
religion are opposed at all. The places and people set apart
in explicitly religious settings may best be understood in
terms of just these ways of and reasons for setting apart,
rather than supposing them effectively or ideally autonomous realms competing for souls with a fallen samsaric
world. The set apart is still, of course, accessible.
‘World’ is a wily word worth claiming. It can lead to
understandings of fragile ‘worldviews’ as well as to the
expectation, disappointed more often than fulfilled, that
people should have worked out a rationally “meaningful
cosmos” (Weber 1978: 451; Berger 1990). The lived religion
theorist’s understanding is less intellectualistic, concerned
more to assert that people of all kinds need and maintain
a coherent field for their projects, an environment of
interlocutors and a horizon for individual and collective
striving. A world here is not an articulated awareness of
the limits, conditions, origins and ends of things but something more like the opposite: a livable world is one we can,
to a significant extent, take for granted as a background
for endeavor or reflection. It doesn’t require blind acceptance or vigilant defense against chaos, but lives in use. It
might be helpful to reconceptualize the ‘worlds’ of ‘world
religions’ in a similar way.

Getting Past ‘Religion’
All of this may seem obvious in a Himalayanist context
where Hindu polytropy (Gellner 2005) and Mahayana
understandings of conventional reality layer with older
traditions in conspicuously pluralistic geological and ecological territory. However, it departs decisively from the
assumptions of what is still the dominant view of religion
in much of contemporary academia and beyond, a view
deeply enmeshed in all the categories and structures of the
modern world system, and one likely to shape non-specialists’ expectations of Himalayan realities. In recent
years the critique of the category of religion has virtually
become a field of its own (Asad 1993, 2003; Dubuisson 2003;
Fitzgerald 2005; Masuzawa 2005; McCutcheon 1997). These
criticisms reveal ‘religion’ to reify and universalize contingent features of modern western colonial experience,
but their arguments are little known beyond the academy.
Lived religion-like approaches may be more effective.
The dominant view is shared by friends and foes of religion
alike. It sees religion as by definition out-of-the-ordinary
if not indeed concerned with renouncing or transcending the everyday world. It thinks of religion as a separate
realm of human concern, relating generally to a separate
world or plane of existence, and served by institutions
which stand at best in a productive tension with the
everyday world and its practices. It thinks of religion as
struggling to make access to this separate world or level
of experience available through practices of setting apart,
ascesis, purification and sanctification. The struggle is not
only with other kinds of institutions, but with the fickleness of ordinary human nature, and with the other (false,
inferior, superstitious, syncretistic) systems it prefers.
This conception of religion emerged in modern times in
the west but many religious studies scholars see it more
specifically as ‘Protestant.’ It was indeed christened by
the German Romantic theologian and future father of
liberal Protestantism Friedrich Schleiermacher in 1799.
Working on analogy with the new science of chemistry,
Schleiermacher claimed to have found that religion has
an ‘essence’ distinct from ethics and science, norms and
explanations. Religion’s “essence is neither thinking nor
acting, but intuition and feeling” (Schleiermacher 1988:
103). Metaphysics, morality and religion have too often
been conflated and confused, generating entirely warranted Enlightenment critiques: religion makes bad science,
and impure morality. Yet the Enlighteners went too far in
thinking religion itself thereby refuted. Once understood
in its true nature religion is seen alone to give depth and
indeed humanity to the abstract and impersonal ways of

thinking and acting of metaphysics and morals. Religion
should be a “holy music” accompanying the activities of
life (Schleiermacher 1988: 110), and when it strays into
other areas, as it inevitably will, should be called back to
itself. Schleiermacher thinks Christianity, especially in its
Protestant form, unique in history in fully understanding
religion’s elusive nature.
Schleiermacher claimed to have ‘rediscovered’ the essence of religion. Scholars today are more apt to call him
the ‘inventor’ of religion. The turn from Enlightenment
to Romanticism and Empire saw the ‘invention’; of many
categories of which it is helpful to see religion as just one:
race, complementary gender, nation and, Michel Foucault
suggested, the human itself. These inventions did not come
from thin air, of course. They seemed to their inventors to
be discoveries because they arose from post-Reformation
practices and structures already so entrenched as to seem
natural. Schleiermacher’s understanding of religion as a
realm apart speaks to and from the world opened up by
the 17th century treaties of Westphalia—separating church
and state while also setting them up as parallel (Beyer
2011a, 2011b). “Methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and
Schiller 2003) and what Sondra Hausner and David Gellner
(2012) in response call “methodological religionism” are
entwined problems.
Born of a “historical situation of religious pluralism and
rivalry” (Smith 1990: 24-25), the dominant view of religion
is the product of broader social, political and economic
forces of which Protestantism is only one expression. It
has been shared by theorists and critics of religion who are
skeptics and atheists as well as by thinkers drawing from
traditions in Catholic, Jewish and even Orthodox thought.
Thinkers like Ludwig Feuerbach, Edward Burnett Tylor and
Emile Durkheim shared with Protestantism, or perhaps
with Empire, the sense that religion was a process of transcending the local, the ritual, the material—and thought it
might eventually transcend itself. Much in social science
theory and research on religious topics traces to categories
and methods emerging from these debates. The modern view of religion—focused on individual experiences
of transcendence, etc.—persists in dogmatic form even
among the ‘new atheists.’
The influence of the dominant view has been strong in
the popular and academic study of religion, notably in the
category of the ‘world religions.’ Tomoko Masuzawa (2005)
has shown how certain religions were deemed worthy of
that designation in late 19th century western scholarship
because of their apparent transcendence of merely
‘national,’ this-worldly and ritual concerns. The truest
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and most transcendent religion was thought to reside in a
world of radical otherness, whether in a moment of pure
disembodied consciousness or an inaccessible mountain
fastness. This view underlay scholars’ antipathy for most
forms of western religion, including Roman Catholicism,
and their fascination with Indian and Buddhist traditions
figured as world-rejecting or world–transcending. The
apparently pluralistic ‘world religions’ paradigm posits
and celebrates analogs to western universalism as the true
heart of religion (Masuzawa 2005).
The world religions paradigm excludes much more than
it includes. It does not only privilege a small number of
‘great’ traditions but favors only certain strands within
them. It encourages us to suppose there is such a thing as
an essential Buddhism or Hinduism or Islam, and to expect
to find it embattled by worldly and ritualizing mediocrities, as well as restive, lazy and indiscriminate masses. In
so doing this paradigm strengthens those within these
traditions who try (often anachronistically) to articulate
and enforce uniformity, hierarchical authority and the
strongest claims for radical discontinuity with other social
and cultural formations. Concerns for doctrinal purity are
not new or Western, of course, but the centralizing imperatives of ‘fundamentalisms’ seeking an unvarying purity
immune to the passage of time arguably are.
Lived religion approaches, by contrast, have no investment in the answers to questions like ‘Is X Buddhist?’ or
‘Is Y Hindu?’ if these are not questions being asked by
someone on the ground. In such cases more specific and
concrete things will always be at stake, and we will want
to know what they are. Lived religion, and people making
resource use decisions, don’t spend time on the question ‘Is
X religious?’ either—though its interest is piqued every
time someone else asks it. In particular contexts it may
be a very important question—likely triggered by legal
concerns. If a context leads someone to ask one of these
questions, there’s a good chance more than one understanding of ‘Buddhist’ or ‘religious’ is involved, none really
corresponding in general or in particular to the template
of the world religions.
One can summarize the case against the dominant view by
saying that ‘religion,’ claiming to be a descriptive category,
is really a normative one (McGuire 2008). Whether used by
those who want to protect ‘religion’ or destroy it, this view
sees religion in its truest form as other-worldly, striving to
represent in consistency and purity an alternative to the
mundane passions and muddled compromises of human
life. While apparently charmed by naïve practice, this approach systematically defers to the views of religious elites
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and authorities, sharing their contempt for this-worldly
concerns and their horror at perceived syncretism. It sees
ordinary folks as dupes, cynics or manipulators (Latour
2010). It doesn’t deny that ordinary people can integrate
religion into their lives, indeed reorganize their lives in
rough accordance with it, but it thinks only the initiated,
those whose lives are set apart from the everyday, really
understand what’s at stake.
The study of lived religion is a tonic to those who wish to
move beyond the dominant view. Lived religion approaches assert the humanity and creativity of all traditions and
people within them. While not assuming that religion is
always (or ever) a good thing, it takes seriously people’s
decisions about practices and the devotion of resources to
them, and attends to the categories and distinctions they
use in bringing together and setting apart the elements
of their worlds. The dominant view trades in politically
loaded abstractions. Lived religion approaches like resource
use decisions direct our attention to where and how religion lives, and to how the worlds shared by human and
other-than-human are sustained in practice and in time.
Conclusion
I hope I’ve suggested why debates in academic religious
studies both matter and shouldn’t detain us too long. It is
not important to the project of grasping everyday religion’s role in Himalayan ecologies to be able to name the
traditions we are seeing, though it may matter very much
how they are experienced and named by the people we
are concerned with. It is also not important to be able to
distinguish ‘religious’ from, say, ‘traditional,’ ‘social’ or
‘common sense’ practices, except in the surprisingly varied
contexts in which these categories are being employed
to explain or interrogate resource use decisions. It is not
important to distinguish ‘syncretism’ from whatever it is
contrasted with, nor to isolate practices or beliefs involving other, purer worlds than this one. Engaging the
religion-like in the work, relationships and decisions of
the everyday, whether of ordinary people or of religious
specialists, we get a better sense of what’s going on, and in
terms more directly useful for policy analysis and engagement.
At the various scales where religion lives, Himalayan
religious worlds prove as varied and interconnected as
their natural and cultural environments. New challenges
to these worlds, ecological and demographic as well
as political, provide concentrated versions of issues
confronting communities around the world. Resource
landscapes of all kinds—natural, human and other-than-

human—are changing dramatically. Exclusivist and
newly globalized versions of older religious traditions
from Hinduism and Christianity to Tibetan traditions are
upsetting pluralist social ecologies even as Lepcha and Bön
experience a need to demand recognition as ‘religions’
after all. Widely different political systems classify,
support and limit ‘religious’ practices and institutions in
dramatically different ways.
Dominant views of religion, of world religions, and of the
world-renouncing religions which supposedly rise above
Himalayan societies illuminate little of how religion is
lived or environments sustained. It is more important to
be able to understand the many ways the religion-like is
invoked and imagined in action than to provide a new
theory. Resource use decisions, like other lived religion-based
approaches, helps us focus on the work of constructing and
sustaining worlds where embattled relationships of human
and other-than-human may continue. The worlds made
as people take everyday religion up in their hands offer
insights for life in the valleys, hillsides, passes and peaks,
and along the busily trafficked and constantly remapped
routes linking them.
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Endnotes
1. ‘Religion-like’ is a deliberately question-begging
term Ann Taves (2012) uses to open a space for research
into the distinctions people actually make in their lives,
relationships and practices. ‘Religion-like’ doesn’t name
a goal or ideal, but poses a question: to what extent do
we find distinctions analogous to those in the theory of
religion at work in various human cultures? If ‘religion’
is to have a future as a general term for analysis it will
have to be because of its kinship to clusters of ‘religionlike’ categories and distinctions in particular cases. I use
‘religion’ and ‘religion-like’ interchangeably in this essay.
2. ‘Lived religion’ and ‘everyday religion’ are both terms
used in these discussions, in by turns complementary and
overlapping ways. I use ‘lived religion’ as a shorthand for
the larger discourse emerging from attention to what
historian Robert Orsi refers to as “religion as people
actually do and imagine it in the circumstances of their
everyday lives” (Orsi 2005: 158).
3. In this discussion I’m focusing on English-language
scholarship. David D. Hall traces the term ‘lived religion’
to the French religion vécue (1997: vii). In Germany the
English term ‘lived religion’ is used for the study of gelebte
as opposed to gelehrte Religion and bridges concerns of
scholarship and religious pedagogy (Streib, Dinter and
Söderblom 2008).
4. ‘Bricolage’ is a term introduced to anthropology by
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1966) which has had a significant
career in religious studies, too. See, for instance, Stout
(1990), LaFleur (1994), McGuire (2008).
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